








On the Emissions-Inequality Trade-off in Energy Taxation 








































By using estimates from an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), we investigate how the 
German energy tax on car fuels changes the private households’ CO2 emissions, living 
standards, and post-tax income distribution. Our results show that the tax implies a trade-off 
between the aim to reduce emissions and vertical equity, which refers to the idea that people 
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Faced with climate change and threats to environmental sustainability, many countries, 
particularly those in Europe, are redesigning and enhancing their environmental policies to 
reduce the anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions (World Nuclear Association, 2011). 
Despite these changes, residential energy consumption, an important determining factor of 
CO2 emissions, has increased in Europe in recent years (The World Bank, 2013). This 
apparently paradoxical situation calls for thorough investigation of the determinants of 
household energy demand.  
Our study deals with the environmental and distributive effects of the energy tax on car fuels 
in Germany, a country that places high priority on both environmental protection 
(International Energy Agency, 2007) and distributive justice. The energy tax on car fuels is 
charged as a fixed monetary amount per liter and serves as an instrument to reduce 
households’ vehicle emissions, the largest source of CO2 emissions after the industrial sector 
(International Energy Agency, 2007). Crucial for the size of the environmental effect is the 
price elasticity of demand for car fuels: the more elastic the demand, the larger the 
environmental effect in terms of the CO2 emissions reduction. Crucial for the distributive 
effect is the shape of the Engel curve if the expenditure (share) for fuels decreases in income, 
then vertical equity is at risk, as households with a greater ability to pay will then pay lower 
taxes relative to income.  
The potential emissions-inequality trade-off of energy taxation has become an important issue 
in environmental economics.3 As pointed out by Baumol and Oates (1988), by ignoring the 
emissions-inequality trade-off, “we may either unintentionally harm certain groups in society 
or, alternatively, undermine the program politically” (p. 235). Most studies investigate the 
emissions-inequality trade-off in a traditional tax incidence framework, i.e., by quantifying 
average tax burdens at different points of the income distributions. Only few studies, among 
them Jorgenson et al. (1992), Oladosu and Rose (2007), and Grösche and Schröder (2014),  
provide a detailed examination of the redistributive effects using inequality indices (e.g., Gini 
or Theil index), inequality dominance criteria, or related graphical representations 
(concentration or Lorenz curves).  
We study the potential emissions-inequality trade-off of the German energy tax on car fuels 
using a demographically scaled Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS, see Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980, and Ray, 1983). Surprisingly, the redistributive effect of this tax has gained 
                                                 
3 See Pearson and Smith (1991), Brännlund and Nordström (2004), Wier et al. (2005), Scott and Eakins (2004), 
Oladosu and Rose (2007), Callan et al. (2008), Fullerton (2008), Grainger and Kolstad (2009), West and 
Williams III(2004), Jacobsen et al. (2003) or Grösche and Schröder (2014). Studies for Germany include Bach et 
al. (2002) and Sterner (2012). 
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little attention so far, although preferences for ecological sustainability and social justice are 
deeply rooted in German society.4 Time series of commodity prices and the German Income 
and Expenditure Survey (IES), a representative household sample, serve as the empirical 
basis.5 
Our estimates indicate that an emissions–inequality trade-off exists: The energy tax on car 
fuels is effective in lowering CO2 emissions but it is regressive because the tax burden relative 
to income is a decreasing function of household (equivalent) income.6 As an example, 
doubling the tax reduces CO2 emissions by about 17 percent, but increases the level of 
inequality in the post-tax income distribution. The redistributive effect, however, is small in 
quantitative terms. For example, the Gini index increases by about 0.002 percentage points. 
The effect is moderate because expenditures on fuels make up only a small share of household 
total expenditures, about 3.75 percent on average. On the other hand, the welfare loss, as 
captured by the equivalent variation is sizeable: on an annual basis, it amounts to an average 
of 562 euros. The equivalent variation amounts to 232 euros yearly for the 1st decile and to 
961 euros for the 9th decile of the equivalent income distribution. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides a literature review. Section 3 describes 
the data and Section 4 the quantitative methods. Section 5 provides the demand system 
estimates and Section 6 the results from the policy analysis. Section 7 provides a sensitivity 
analysis, and Section 8 presents the concluding remarks.  
 
2	Literature	review		
Several studies have investigated potential emissions-inequality trade-offs in environmental 
taxation. From a technical perspective, the studies can be classified according to three criteria: 
(a) static one-period vs. dynamic multi-period framework; (b) partial analysis of a single 
sector vs. total analysis with inter-sector linkages; (c) abstraction from or explicit modeling of 
behavioral responses.  
Because the literature is so extensive, we confine our review to selected works with a 
framework similar to ours: a one-period partial analysis of the household sector with 
consideration of behavioral responses. One such study is Brännlund and Nordström (2004) 
                                                 
4 The move towards ecological sustainability is seen in the subsidization of renewable technologies, emissions 
regulations, and various environmental taxes. Manifestations of the preference for social justice include 
Germany’s progressive income tax schedule and comprehensive social security system. 
5 The IES is the only German micro database providing in-depth information on household incomes and 
expenditures. Based on the demand system estimates, we study how the actual level of the car fuels tax and 
variations of the tax change the post-tax distribution and CO2 emissions. 
6 Equivalent income is derived by dividing household income by the modified OECD equivalence scale (see 
Section 4.3 for details). 
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using Swedish data. They use the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) and tax 
simulations to analyze the consumer responses and welfare effects of a CO2 tax. The authors 
find that doubling of the CO2 tax lowers petrol demand by ten percent.7 Further, using the 
compensating variation as assessment criterion, the authors show that low-income 
households, in relative terms to income, carry a larger share of the tax burden in comparison 
to high-income households, meaning that the tax is regressive. The compensating variation as 
percentage of disposable income was found to be 0.55 for the poorest and only 0.33 for the 
richest households. In a related study, Brännlund and Ghalwash (2008) find that equalization 
of income will lead to higher emissions in Sweden. They have used the estimates from 
QUAIDS as well as emissions intensities to investigate the nonlinear nature of the income 
emissions relationship. 
West and Williams III (2004) use a one-period analysis of the US household sector, 
considering behavioral responses in the framework of a general demand system. They 
quantify welfare changes and redistributive effects (but not the environmental effect) of the 
US gasoline tax, and show that it is regressive (except when the revenue is used to fund lump-
sum transfers). Using a generalized logit demand system, Dumagan and Mount (1992) find 
that the welfare effect of carbon tax in the US is non-negligible; the welfare losses increase 
with income but decrease as proportion of income.   
Tiezzi (2005) estimates an AIDS for Italy in order to explore the distributional and welfare 
effects of a carbon tax. She finds that the welfare loss from an introduction of the carbon tax 
is non-negligible: 2.32 billion euros over four years. Contrary to many other studies, she finds 
that the tax burden is progressively distributed across Italian households:  the welfare loss as a 
percentage of expenditures increases with income. However, different from other studies she 
uses total monthly expenditures as opposed to income as the ordering criterion. 
 
3	Data	and	data	preparation	
We use two data sources provided to us by the German Federal Statistical Office. The first 
data source is the German Income and Expenditure Survey (IES), i.e., representative micro-
level household income and expenditure data. The second data source is consumer prices for 
various expenditure categories.  
 
                                                 
7 In a later study, Brännlund et al. (2007) find that in order to keep CO2 emissions at their initial levels (to 




The German IES is a cross-sectional household micro database, collected once every five 
years. Each wave includes a quota sample of about 60,000 German households, for which 
frequency weights are provided to ensure representativeness (for further information on the 
data see Bönke et al., 2013, and references therein). The variable spectrum of the data is 
broad, including socio-economic and demographic characteristics, incomes and other 
revenues, paid taxes and contributions, inventories, wealth (accumulation). Most importantly 
for our purposes, IES is the single German database with in-depth information on all kinds of 
household expenditures—from food and electrical appliances to cars and car fuels. 
From the most recent IES waves 1993 to 2008, we have generated a pooled database with 
time-consistent information. Generating such a pooled database was a challenging task; 
variables have been added and removed, notation of variables and accounting periods of 
income or expenditures have changed, et cetera. Details on the pooling strategy can be found 
in Bönke et al. (2013). Most importantly, we have converted all expenditures to yearly 
amounts in euros and implemented a symmetric trimming of disposable incomes (lowest and 
highest percentile of the distribution). Furthermore, households with extreme ratios of total 
expenditures relative to disposable income are not included in the sample.8 
The final working sample includes 169,486 households in four cross-sections. The following 
IES variables are used in the empirical analysis: total expenditures; expenditures for food, 
electricity, other fuels, and car fuels;9 disposable income; number and age of household 
members; and frequency weights.  
The core variable for the analysis that follows is expenditure on car fuels. It can be derived 
from the original IES waves by combining a set of variables, identified by a uniform short 
notation “ef” (German abbreviation for an identifier) and a serial number. For 1993, 
expenditure on car fuels is the sum of ef761, ef762, and ef763. For 1998-2008, they it is the 
sum of ef810, ef299, and ef300.  Unfortunately, separate data on gasoline and diesel fuel is 
available only for 1993, making it impossible to separate the two fuels in the empirical 
analysis. 
Figure 1 represents the development of the expenditure shares over time. The expenditure 
shares are calculated by dividing a specific good expenditure over total expenditures.  Each 
panel of Figure 1 shows the 10th, 50th (median), and 90th percentile of the expenditure share 
for each good. The food share decreased between 1993 and 2003 and increased between 2003 
                                                 
8Households belonging to the lowest and highest percentile of the distribution of total expenditures relative to 
disposable income were excluded from the sample. 
9 The choice of the expenditure categories follows Brännlund et al. (2007). 
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and 2008. The share of electricity declined slightly from 1993 to 1998 and increased 
thereafter.  The expenditure shares for car fuels and other fuels increased steadily over the 
entire period under consideration. The mean share of car fuel expenditures over the whole 
period is 0.038.  The share of other goods increased between 1993 and 1998 and declined 
thereafter. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the expenditures shares and disposable income. The 
food share in total expenditures is highest (0.171) for the households belonging to the lowest 
disposable income deciles and decreases with income; for the richest households it is 0.125. 
While the electricity share of the poorest households takes 3.5 percent of their total 
expenditures (m), for the richest households it is only 2.2 percent of m. The expenditure share 
of other fuels is also decreasing with disposable income. The car fuels expenditure share 
displays a nonlinear relationship with income: for the households in the 1st income decile it is 
0.023; it increases to around 0.045 for the 6th and 7th deciles and then decrease slightly to 
0.041 for the 10th decile. In contrast to all the other expenditure shares, the share of other 
goods is increasing with disposable income. 
  
Figure 2 about here 
 
Tables A1-A4 in the Appendix show the construction of the variables in our empirical 
analysis. Summary statistics of these variables are provided in Tables A5-A8 in the Appendix. 
Figure A1 provides the kernel density functions for the expenditure shares by household types 
for 2008. Densities for food and electricity indicate that both goods have characteristics of 
basic goods: basically all households are report positive expenditure shares.10 For other fuels 
and car fuels a substantial fraction of households do not seem to consume the goods, as they 
have no related expenditures. The densities also indicate some marked differences across 
household types: particularly, the expenditure shares for food and car fuels increase in 
household size, whereas the opposite holds for other goods. 
 
                                                 
10 The small fraction of households with expenditure shares of zero for electricity can be 
explained by particular social security instruments that step in once households cannot afford 




Because the German Federal Statistical Office is responsible for collecting the IES data and 
computing consumer prices for various goods, we find the same categorization of 
consumption aggregates in both data sources.  
From the consumer prices and household expenditure data, we derive Stone Price Indices 
(SPI) for three broad expenditure categories: food, other fuels, and other goods. SPIs reflect 
differences in consumption patterns across household units.  
To derive the SPIs, we follow the approach outlined in Hoderlein and Mihailova (2008). Let 
ܽ ൌ 1,… , ܣ denote the different expenditure categories. An expenditure category can 
encompass several sub-categories of expenditures, ܽଵ, … , ܽௌ. The corresponding prices are 
݌௔భ, … , ݌௔ೄ. The expenditure share of an expenditure category ܽ for household ݄ in period ݐ, 
ݓ௔,௛,௧, is defined as, ݓ௔,௛,௧ ൌ ݔ௔,௛,௧ ∑ ݔ௔,௛,௧௔⁄ , with ݔ௔,௛,௧ denoting nominal expenditures.     
The SPI for category  ܽ is, 	 ௔ܲ,௛,௧ ൌ ଵ௞	∏ ሺ
௣ೌೞ
௪ೌೞ,೓,೟
ሻ௪ೌೞ,೓,೟௔ೞ , with ݇ ൌ 	∏ ሺݓ௔ೞ,௧ሻି௪ೌೞ,೟௔ೞ , and with 
ݓഥ௔ೞ,௧ denoting the expenditure share of the reference household in period ݐ. A household with 
average budget shares is taken as the reference household. Finally, the prices for each 
category are divided by the lowest price in the base period (1993).  
Summary statistics of prices are provided in Tables A5-A8 in the Appendix. The price of car 
fuels increased over time during the period under observation; the mean price index in 2008 
was 1.552, which represents 83percent increase from the price in 1993. Thus, the increase in 
car fuel expenditures over the period can be attributed largely to price increases but also to 




Our policy analysis steps on a demographically scaled AIDS following Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980) and Ray (1983). The starting point for the demand equations is the 
specification of a function that is general enough to be a second-order approximation to a 
utility or cost function. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) chose the Price-Independent 
Generalized Logarithmic (PIGLOG) preferences, with demands having expenditure shares 
linear in logarithm of total expenditures. These demands arise from indirect utility function 
ሺܸሻ, which are linear in logarithm of total expenditures: 
 




In equation (1), ln	ሺ݉ሻ stands for logarithm of total expenditures; the demographic variables 
ݖଵ and ݖଶ represent the number of adults and the number of children in the household;  
ln	ሺܽሺ݌ሻሻ  represents the cost of subsistence, which takes a translog form: 
 
ሺ2ሻ			ln	ሺܽ	ሺ݌ሻሻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅	∑ ߙ௜ln	ሺ݌௜ሻ௡௜ୀଵ ൅ 0.5∑ ∑ ߛ௜௝ln	ሺ݌௜ሻ௡௝ୀଵ௡௜ୀଵ ln	ሺ݌௝ሻ.  
  
 Moreover, ܾሺ݌ሻ represents the cost of bliss, and is a simple Cobb-Douglas price aggregator: 
 
ሺ3ሻ			ܾሺ݌ሻ ൌ 	∏ ݌௜ఉ೔	ାఏ೔భ௭భାఏ೔మ௭మ௡௜ୀଵ .   
      
The PIGLOG preferences can be represented by the expenditure or cost function, which 
defines the minimum expenditure necessary to attain a specific utility level at given prices.  
The cost function of a certain household takes the following form:  
 
ሺ4ሻ		 ln൫ܥሺܸ, ݌ሻ൯ ൌ ln൫ܽሺ݌ሻ൯ ൅ ܾሺ݌ሻ lnሺܸሻ.       




஼ ൌ ݓ௜,         
 
where ݓ௜ represents the budget expenditure share of specific good ݅ in total expenditures ݉.  
To ease notation, we suppress household and period subscripts in the explanation that follows.  
The estimable demand system then takes the following form: 
 
ሺ6ሻ			ݓ௜ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜௝ln	ሺ݌௝	ሻ௡௝ୀଵ ൅ ሺߚ௜ ൅ ߠ௜ଵݖଵ ൅ ߠ௜ଶݖଶሻ൫lnሺ݉ሻ െ ln൫ܽሺ݌ሻ൯ െ
																						ln	ሺ1 ൅ ߩଵݖଵ ൅ ߩଶݖଶሻ൯ ൅	ݑ௜. 
  
The number of goods included in the system is ݅ ൌ 1,… , ݊. The parameters to be estimated 
include: ߙ௜, ߚ௜, ߛ௜௝, ߩ௜, ߠ௜ ; ߙ଴ is set at the lowest level of logarithm of total expenditures in the 
base year; ݑ௜ is the error term. Several restrictions are imposed on the parameters in order to 




ሺ7ሻ			∑ ߙ௜ ൌ 1,௜ 	∑ ߚ௝ ൌ 0,௝ 	∑ ߛ௞௝ ൌ 0௞ , ∑ ߠ௜ଵ ൌ ∑ ߠ௜ଶ ൌ 0௜ 		௜    
        
Exogeneity is also required in the estimation of demand systems in order to have consistent 
and unbiased estimates (see Blundell and Robin (1999) for details)	. However, it is virtually 
impossible for expenditures to be exogenous in a set of demand functions, and thus the 
exogeneity assumption is likely to be violated (LaFrance, 1991). In particular, the budget 
shares of the commodities are likely to be jointly determined with total expenditures, making 
total expenditures endogenous in the budget equations. Endogenity is problematic as it may 
induce inconsistent parameter estimates.11 Moreover, LaFrance (1991) finds evidence that the 
endogeneity significantly impacts the demand parameter estimates. In order to treat the 
endogeneity problem, we follow the augmented regression technique of Blundell and Robin 
(1999). The error term can be rewritten as,  
 
													ሺ8ሻ		ݑ௜ ൌ 	 ߥ௜ݒ ൅	ߝ௜,  
 
and it can be safely assumed that ܧሺߝ௜|݉ሻ ൌ 0. Here ݒ represents the residual from the 
reduced-form equation for ln	ሺ݉ሻ. Time trend, income, income squared, prices, and 
demographic variables are included in the equation explaining ln	ሺ݉ሻ. All the variables 
included in the reduced-form equation are statistically significant (see Table A9 in the 
Appendix). Using the residuals from the reduced-form equation as explanatory variables in 
the budget share equations allows us to correct for the potential endogeneity. 
In order to obtain the income and price elasticities, equation (6) needs to be differentiated 
with respect to lnሺ݉ሻ to obtain income elasticity, and with respect to ln	ሺ݌௝ሻ to derive the 
price elasticity, 
 
ሺ9ሻ			ߝ௜ ൌ ఓ೔௪೔ ൅ 1, where  
ሺ10ሻ			ߤ௜ ≡ డ௪೔డ୪୬	ሺ௠ሻ ൌ ߚ௜ ൅ ∑ ߠ௜௞ݖ௞ଶ௞ୀଵ  . 
 
Equation (9) represents the income elasticity of demand. Goods with positive income 
elasticity are normal goods; otherwise they are Giffen goods. Income elasticity lower than one 
indicates necessities, whereas elasticity greater than one is a sign of luxury goods.   
The uncompensated price elasticity is calculated according to, 
                                                 




ሺ11ሻ			ߝ௜௝௨ ൌ ఓ೔ೕ௪೔ െ ߜ௜௝, where  
 ሺ12ሻ			ߤ௜௝ ≡ 	 డ௪೔డ୪୬	ሺ௣ೕሻ ൌ ߛ௜௝ െ ߤ௜ሺߙ௝ ൅ ∑ ߛ௝௞ln	ሺ݌௞
௡௞ୀଵ ሻሻ, 
 
and ߜ௜௝ is the Kroneker delta, ߜ௜௝ ൌ 1 for ݅ ൌ ݆ and 0 otherwise. 
The compensated price elasticity is calculated as: 
 
 ሺ13ሻ			ߝ௜௝௖ ൌ ߝ௜௝௨ ൅ ߝ௜ݓ௝. 
 
The own-price elasticity should have a negative sign. If ߝ௜௝௖  is lower than one, the demand for 
the good is inelastic.  If ߝ௜௝௖   is higher than one, demand is price-elastic.  Negative cross-price 
elasticity indicates complementary goods, whereas positive cross-price elasticity indicates 
substitute goods.  
4.2	The	energy	tax	on	car	fuels	
In Germany, two taxes are levied on top of the producer price of car fuels: the energy tax and 
the value-added tax. The energy tax is a quantity tax charged per liter. It differs between 
gasoline and diesel fuel. The tax base of the value-added tax is the fuel price per liter 
including the energy taxes. Hence, for our period of investigation, 2008, the end consumer 
price of car fuels takes the form:12  
 
ሺ14ሻ			 ௚ܲ ൌ ൫ܲ ௚ܲ ൅ ܥܯ௚ ൅ ܧ ௚ܶ൯ ∗ ሺ1 ൅ ܸܣܶሻ=ሺ0.525 ൅ 0.655ሻ ∗ ሺ1.19ሻ ൌ 1.400   
ሺ15ሻ			 ௗܲ ൌ ሺܲ ௗܲ ൅ ܥܯௗ ൅ ܧ ௗܶሻ ∗ ሺ1 ൅ ܸܣܶሻ=ሺ0.650 ൅ 0.470ሻ ∗ ሺ1.19ሻ ൌ 1.333   
 
௚ܲ and ௗܲ stand for the consumer price of gasoline and diesel; ܲ ௚ܲ and ܲ ௗܲ represent the price 
of the product (the import price of gasoline or diesel); ܥܯ௚ and ܥܯௗ denote the contribution 
margins (this part covers the expenses of the mineral oil groups and their profits plus costs of 
the emergency storage fund); ܧܶ denotes the energy tax13 (since 1999 it also includes the 
green tax; the tax rate is different for the different fuels: ܧ ௚ܶ ൌ 0.470	݁ݑݎ݋ݏ/݈݅ݐ݁ݎ and 
                                                 
12 See Federal Ministry of Finance, 2014.  
13 The energy tax is imposed on the basis of the Energy Tax Act of 15 July 2006. See Energy Tax Act, Federal 
Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 2014. The energy tax was called the mineral oil tax 
(Mineraölsteuer) until 2006.  
11 
 
ܧ ௗܶ ൌ 0.655	݁ݑݎ݋ݏ/݈݅ݐ݁ݎ); VAT denotes the value added tax14 (19 percent levied on the total 
price including the energy tax). 
Because in the IES we cannot distinguish between diesel and gasoline from 1998 and on, we 
have constructed a weighted average for the end user price on car fuels, using the 
consumption shares of gasoline and diesel in total car fuel consumption in 2008 as weights 
(0.73 and 0.27, respectively15). A weighted average was constructed in the same way for the 
energy tax.  
4.3	Policy	evaluation	criteria	
To explore the environmental and redistributive effects of the German energy tax on car fuels, 
we follow Banks et al. (1997).  Basically, expenditure functions, indirect utility function, 
subsistence, and bliss levels (all of these functions were introduced in Section 4.1) are derived 
for different levels of the tax.  
Using these estimates, we assess how the tax impacts the demand for car fuels and related 
emissions. The environmental criterion involves comparisons of the car-related CO2 
emissions for the status quo tax rate and variations in the tax rate following Brännlund et al. 
(2007). More precisely, the status quo CO2 emissions are calculated by multiplying the carbon 
factor of car fuels ሺߠሻ with the initial quantity of the good ሺݍ଴ሻ: ܧ଴ ൌ 	ߠݍ଴.  The after-tax 
emissions are:  ܧଵ ൌ 	ߠݍଵ. 
To understand the distributional effects of the tax, an indicator of material welfare is required 
to rank the households. A widely accepted indicator is equivalent income, which represents 
income adjusted for the differences in the material needs of households of different 
composition (number of adults and children). The OECD equivalence scale is used for this 
adjustment. It is defined as: 
 
ሺ16ሻ			Equivalence	scale	 ൌ 	1	 ൅ 	0.5	 ∗ 	adults ൅ 0.3	 ∗ 	children. 
 
After having sorted the households in increasing order of equivalent income, we compute the 
welfare changes due to the tax on car fuels along the distribution. To do so, we make use of 
the following measures: 
1. Changes in tax burdens due to a change in the tax rate, ߂ݐ	 ൌ ሺܧܶଵ െ	ܧܶ଴ሻݍଵ. 
                                                 
14 The Value Added Tax is imposed on the basis of the Value Added Tax Act of 15 July 2006. See Value Added 
Tax Act, Federal Ministry of Justice and consumer protection, 2014. 




  2. Equivalent variation ሺܧܸሻ, ܧܸ ൌ 	݁	ሺ݌ଵ, ܸଵሻ– 	݁	ሺ݌଴, ܸଵሻ. ܧܸ is the amount of 
money that a household is willing to give up in order to avert the price change.  
3. Inequality indices. We use two well-established indices, the Gini index, ܩ, and the 
Theil index, ܶ. More inequality always means a higher index.  
 
5	Demand	System	Estimates	
The AIDS includes the expenditure shares of the following five categories: food, electricity, 
other fuels, car fuels, and an aggregate of other goods. A demographically scaled version is 
estimated using the numbers of adults and children as explanatory variables. 
Table 1 summarizes the mean income elasticity of all the expenditure categories.16 The lower 
and upper bounds of 95 percent confidence intervals are also included in the table. The 
income elasticities show that food, electricity, other fuels, and car fuels are normal and 
necessity goods. A one percent increase in income will lead to 0.752 percent increase in the 
demand for car fuels. Similar interpretations can be made for the other elasticities.  The 
aggregate of other goods is normal but a luxury good (income elasticity is higher than 1). 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 2 includes the own-price and cross-price elasticities of the five expenditure categories 
in the demand system. Food is almost price-elastic (-0.950) for the average German 
household. The cross-price elasticities reveal that food and electricity are substitute goods. 
Food demand would increase by 0.029 percent if the price of electricity increased by one 
percent. Food is a complementary good to other fuels and also to car fuels.  
Household demand for electricity in Germany is price-inelastic with own-price elasticity of -
0.787. Electricity and other fuels are substitute goods; similarly, electricity and car fuels are 
substitutes. Demand for other fuels is also price-inelastic (-0.566). Other fuels and car fuels 
are found to be substitutes (0.155). Electricity and other goods are found to be complement 
goods. Car fuel demand is found to be price-inelastic in Germany (-0.165). Finally, car fuels 
and other goods are complementary goods, with negative cross-price elasticity (-0.514). 
Demand for other goods is price-elastic; a 1.049 percent fall in demand for other goods is 
                                                 
16 Further details on the AIDS coefficient estimates can be found in Table A10 in the Appendix. 
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caused by one percent increase in the good’s own price. Our elasticities estimates are to some 
extent comparable to the estimates of Kohn and Missong (2003) and Beznoska (2014) 17. 
Looking at the coefficients of the demographic variables provides some interesting insights 
(see Table A10 in the Appendix). Our reference household is a single adult household without 
children. Households with two adults have 96.41 percent higher costs than households with 
one adult. Adding one child adds 40.98 percent to the overall costs of the family. Moreover, 
the statistical significance of the thetas confirms that allowing the scale to vary with prices 
permits for substitution responses and provides a better model fit.   
 
Table 2 about here 
 
6	Policy	analyses	
To understand the emissions-inequality trade-off of the German energy tax on car fuels, we 
first characterize the status quo, that is, the situation in 2008. In 2008, the energy tax on car 
fuels amounted to 0.606 euros per liter of car fuel. Table 3 presents the key figures on 
emissions, tax burdens, and inequality indices for the post-tax distributions. All the numbers 
relate to a period of one year. The average household produces car-related emissions of 2.073 
tons of CO2 and pays 523 euros in energy tax on car fuels. The level of inequality in the post-
tax equivalent income distribution, as captured by the Gini index (Theil index), is 0.266 
(0.115). 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Departing from the status quo, we assess two alternative scenarios: one scenario in which the 
tax is zero and a second scenario where it is doubled. The results are summarized in Table 4. 
In the zero-tax scenario, CO2 emissions increase to 2.319 tons per household, a 12 percent 
emission increase compared with the 2008 status quo. The average monetary welfare gain due 
to the reduction of the tax burden,18 as captured by the equivalent variation, is 682 euros, and 
the Gini and the Theil indices indicate a moderate reduction of inequality (by about 0.003 
points). This is because poorer households spend a larger proportion of their income on car 
                                                 
17 Kohn and Missong (2003) estimate a non-demographic QUAIDS for broad number of goods categories in 
Germany for the years 1988-1993, while Beznoska (2014) estimates a non-demographic AIDS for Germany for 
energy, mobility and leisure for the years 1998-2008. 
18 Note that the equivalent variation does not capture potential welfare losses from rising emissions. 
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fuels than richer households. In the scenario where the tax is doubled, the EV indicates a 
welfare loss19 of 562 euros, and both inequality indices indicate a slight inequality increase.  
Car fuels consumption and consequently emissions decrease to 1.726 tons per household, 
which would represent 17 percent lower emissions than in the 2008 status quo. Austin and 
Dinan (2005) find the gasoline tax as an efficient policy instrument for achieving great 
immediate gasoline savings, by encouraging people to drive less and eventually to buy more 
fuel efficient cars.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
To better understand how changes in the tax rate impact “rich” and “poor” households, 
Figures 2 and 3 provide the decile-specific average changes in CO2 emissions, tax burdens, 
and equivalent variations. 
The zero-tax scenario is summarized in Figure 3. As can be seen from the upper left graph, 
emissions increase for all the deciles and exhibit an inverse u-shaped relationship. The 
emissions increase starts at 0.179 tons for the poorest households, grows to 0.291 tons for the 
households in the middle of the equivalent income distribution, and declines to 0.151 tons for 
the richest households. The percentage increase in emissions, however, is decreasing over the 
deciles. It appears that the tax cut makes more poor households start to drive cars, and hence 
the percentage increase in emissions is largest for them. Lowering the tax therefore means that 
demand increases for all households and in particular for those that did not consume in the 
initial situation. The initial non-consumers are most frequently found in the lowest equivalent 
income deciles; namely 33 percent of all car fuels non-consumers in 2008 are in the first 
decile, 17 percent in the second, 11 percent in the third, and so on. The tax cut will not 
drastically alter the car fuel consumption patterns or the emissions amounts of the rich 
households.  The upper right panel represents the changes in the tax burdens in euros. The tax 
relief is smallest for the poorest households (260 euros) and largest for the richest households 
(826 euros). The same holds for the equivalent variations; the welfare gain is largest for the 
richest.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
                                                 
19 All the welfare results derived from the EV are reconfirmed by the CV. The respective results are provided in 
the Appendix (see Table A11 and Figure A2).  
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Figure 4 refers to the scenario where the tax is doubled. In terms of emission reductions, the 
effect is smallest for the poorest households (-0.183 t) and largest for the richest households  
(-0.505 t). However, the percentage change in CO2 emissions is largest for the poor and 
decreases as equivalent income increases. Thus, the largest car-related emissions reductions, 
and consumption reductions, would come from the poorest households. The tax burden 
increases across the deciles (168 euros for the poorest and 571 euros for the richest decile), 
and the same holds for the equivalent variation as measure of welfare loss in this case (277 
euros for poorest and 895 euros for the richest decile). Galinato and Yoder (2010) find that a 
Pigovian tax on motor fuels increases the welfare of consumers in the US, but only when the 
tax revenue collected is recycled. Increasing the tax means that demand drops for all 
households except for those that have zero consumption in the status quo. As already 
mentioned, these households are particularly frequent in the lower deciles of the distribution. 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
The previous analysis has indicated the presence of an emissions–inequality trade-off: 
increasing the energy tax on car fuels lowers emissions but increases inequality in the post-tax 
income distribution. The intensity of the trade-off is described in Figure 4. It provides 
emission and inequality levels as a function of the tax rate, and the quintessence of the two 
relationships: the intensity of the trade-off. In the status quo, total car-related emissions of the 
German households are 77.7 Megatons (Mt) and the Gini index is 0.267.20  Increasing 
(lowering) the tax by 50 percent lowers (increases) emissions by 8.9 percent (9.7 percent) but 
increases (decreases) the Gini index by 0.4 percent (0.4 percent). Policy makers are yet to 
decide how to weigh environmental goals against equality concerns to determine an optimal 
tax level. 
 




Our main results rely on a demographically scaled version of the AIDS. We have also 
estimated an unscaled version that is less general to examine the sensitivity of the elasticities 
from the scaled version. As expected, the scaled version provides a better fit to the data: the 
                                                 
20 The relationship between the Theil index and emissions is depicted in Figure A3, and the patterns are the same 
as with the Gini index.  
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R2 is higher in the demographic system for all goods except for other fuels (see Table 5). The 
income and price elasticities of the two models are rather close (see Table 5).    
 
Table 5 about here 
 
As another robustness check, we allow for price and income elasticities to differ across 
income levels. Here we resort to the demographic specification of the demand system. Table 6 
shows the elasticities for each quartile of the equivalent income distribution. Overall, the 
estimated income elasticities do not differ substantially across quartiles. Critical for our policy 
analysis is the price elasticity of demand for car fuels. The results are that households at the 
top of the distribution respond to an increase in the price of car fuels with a stronger reduction 
in fuel demand than households at the bottom of the distribution. Using the quartile-specific 
elasticities would therefore imply an intensification of the estimated emissions-inequality 
trade-off. 
 




Understanding household energy demand is integral part of German energy policy. Our 
analysis sheds light on an important instrument for reducing CO2 emissions in Germany: the 
energy tax on car fuels. In particular, we study how the tax alters the household demand for 
car fuels, associated emissions, and the distribution of post-tax income.   
Our estimates indicate the presence of an emissions-inequality trade-off: an increase in the tax 
rate lowers CO2 emissions but increases inequality in the distribution of post-tax income. 
Unfortunately, other environmental policies in Germany also produce undesired regressive 
effects. For example, in a recent study, Grösche and Schröder (2014) assess the redistributive 
effects of the promotion of renewables in the electricity mix through a feed-in tariff and find 
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Note. Median values of expenditure shares and 10th and 90th percentile are given.  

















































































Note. Average values of variables and lower and upper bound of 95% confidence intervals  
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Note. Average values of variables and lower and upper bound of 95% confidence intervals  
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Note. Average values of variables and lower and upper bound of 95% confidence intervals  
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Note. Average values of total emissions (and Gini index) and lower and upper bound of  
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Expenditure category Income elasticity 
Food 0.503 
 [0.469; 0.537] 
Electricity 0.540 
 [0.538; 0.542] 
Other fuels 0.707 
 [0.706; 0.708] 
Car fuels 0.752 
 [0.751; 0.754] 
Other goods 1.140 
 [1.139; 1.141] 
Note. Average values of the coefficient estimates and  
lower and upper bound of 95%  are provided.  
Database is IES, 1993-2008. 
 
Table	2.	Price	elasticities	(uncompensated)	
Food Electricity Other fuels Car fuels Other goods 
Food -0.950 0.029 -0.027 -0.054 0.499 










Electricity 0.165 -0.787 0.204 0.076 -0.198 










Other fuels -0.147 0.148 -0.584 0.163 -0.288 










Car fuels -0.241 0.045 0.143 -0.165 -0.534 










Other goods 0.004 -0.023 -0.028 -0.043 -1.050 










Note. Average values of the coefficient estimates and lower and upper bound of 95% confidence intervals are 











(in euros) Gini index Theil index 
Status 
quo 
0.606 2.073 523. 459 0.266 0.115 
[0.524; 0.688] [2.062; 2.084] [520.675; 526.243] [0.265; 0.267] [0.114; 0.116] 





Tax rate Emissions Tax burden EV  
(in euros) Gini index Theil index (in euros/l) (in tons) (in euros) 
No tax 0 2.319 0 -682.649 0.263 0.112 
 
[2.307;  









1.212 1.726 871.654 561.566 0.268 0.116 









Note. Average values of the variables and lower and upper bound of 95% confidence intervals  








Food 0.824 0.503 
 [0.823; 0.825] [0.469; 0.537] 
Electricity 0.622 0.540 
 [0.621; 0.623] [0.538; 0.542] 
Other fuels 0.567 0.707 
 [0.565; 0.569] [0.706; 0.708] 
Car fuels 1.101 0.752 
 [1.100; 1.102] [0.751; 0.754] 
Other goods 1.063 1.140 
 [1.062; 1.064] [1.139; 1.141] 
Price elasticities 
Food -1.143 -0.950 
 [-1.142; -1.144] [-0.953; -0.947] 
Electricity -0.663 -0.787 
 [-0.664; -0.662] [-0.788; -0.786] 
Other fuels -0.731 -0.584 
 [-0.732; -0.730] [-0.586; -0.582] 
Car fuels -0.195 -0.165 
 [-0.196; -0.194] [-0.166; -0.164] 
Other goods -1.028 -1.050 
   [-1.029; -1.027] [-1.051; -1.049] 
Goodness-of- fit measure (R2)   
Food share 0.868 0.892 
Electricity share 0.707 0.712
Other fuels share 0.507 0.498 
Car fuels share 0.602 0.611 
Other goods share 0.457 0.525 
Note. Average values of the variables and lower and upper bound of 95% confidence 







quartiles   0- 25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-100% 
Income elasticities 
Food 1.115 1.178 1.187 0.650 
 [1.114; 1.116] [1.177; 1.179] [1.186; 1.188] [0.645; 0.655] 
Electricity 0.861 0.908 0.822 0.471 
 [0.860; 0.862] [0.907; 0.909] [  0.821; 0.823] [0.469; 0.473] 
Other fuels 0.707 0.728 0.589 0.129 
 [0.706; 0.708] [0.727; 0.729] [0.588; 0.590] [-0.496; 0.755] 
Car fuels 1.483 1.162 0.949 0.383 
 [1.474; 1.492] [1.161; 1.163] [0.948; 0.950] [0.377; 0.388] 
Other goods 0.965 0.968 0.9912 1.140 
 [0.964; 0.966] [0.967; 0.969] [0.990; 0.992] [1.139; 1.141] 
Price elasticities 
Food -1.227 -1.271 -1.316 -1.027 
 [-1.228; -1.226] [-1.272; -1.270] [-1.317; -1.315] [-1.028; -1.026] 
Electricity -0.932 -0.833 -0.868 -0.612 
 [-0.933; -0.931] [-0.834; -0.832] [-0.869; -0.867] [-0.613; -0.611] 
Other fuels -0.636 -0.821 -0.829 -0.493 
 [-0.637; -0.635] [-0.822; -0.820] [-0.830; -0.828] [-0.766; -0.219] 
Car fuels -0.041 -0.227 -0.278 -0.426 
 [  -0.055; -0.029] [0.228; -0.226] [-0.279; -0.277] [-0.432; -0.421] 
Other goods -0.896 -0.909 -0.933 -1.049 
 [-0.897; -0.895] [-0.910; -0.908] [-0.934; -0.932] [-1.050; -1.048] 
Note. Average values of the variables and lower and upper bound of 95% confidence intervals are provided. 







Original IES variables in each category Content 
Food and beverages (no alcohol, no tobacco) 
ef109   Food, beverages and tobacco 
ef644   Other beverages, tobacco 
Electricity 
ef705  Electricity 
Other fuels 
ef707  Gas 
ef709  Liquid fuels 
ef711  Hard coal 
ef713  Coke 
ef715  Lignite 
ef718  District heating, hot water 
Car fuels 
ef761  Gasoline 
ef762  Diesel 
ef763  Consumables for motor vehicles and bicycles 






Original IES variables in each category Content 
Food and beverages (no alcohol, no tobacco) 
ef125  Food, Beverages, Tobacco 
ef740  Tobacco 
Electricity 
ef770  Electricity (tenant/subtenant) 
ef771  Electricity (owner) 
ef772  Electricity (benefits in kind) 
Other fuels 
ef773  Gas (tenant/subtenant) 
ef774  Gas (owner) 
ef775  Gas (benefits in kind) 
ef776  Liquid fuels (tenant/subtenant) 
ef777  Liquid fuels (owner) 
ef778  Liquid fuels (benefits in kind) 
ef779  Solid fuels (tenant/subtenant) 
ef780  Solid fuels (owner) 
ef781  Solid fuels (benefits in kind) 
ef782  District heating (tenant/subtenant) 
ef783  District heating (owner) 
ef784  District heating (benefits in kind) 
Car fuels 
ef810  Fuels and lubricants for private vehicles 





Original IES variables in each category Content 
Food and beverages (no alcohol, no tobacco) 
ef51  Food and beverages 
Electricity 
ef258  Electricity (incl. solar energy) 
Other fuels 
ef259  Gas 
ef260  Heating oil 
ef261  Other fuels 
ef262  District heating, warm water 
Car fuels 
ef299  Fuels and lubricants 
Note. Database is IES 2003. 
 
Table	A4.	Identifiers	of	the	underlying	original	IES	2008	variables		
Original IES variables in each category Content 
Food and beverages (no alcohol, no tobacco) 
ef61  Food and beverages 
Electricity 
ef251  Electricity (incl. solar energy) 
Other fuels 
ef252  Gas 
ef253  Heating oil 
ef254  Coal, wood, and other solid fuels 
ef255  District heating, hot water 
Car fuels 
ef300  Fuels and lubricants 





Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
disp. inc. 38378 33630.450 17749.480 7016.458 105893.200 
t. expenditures 38378 26732.410 13139.430 3488.475 138006.000 
food exp. 38378 4338.383 2399.318 2556.453 47433.570 
electricity exp. 38378 601.557 4356.844 0.000 8141.812 
other fuels exp. 38378 701.997 5169.145 0.000 13367.220 
car fuels exp. 38378 698.220 5816.776 0.000 6959.194 
other exp. 38378 20392.250 11219.500 1221.674 126590.700 
food share 38378 0.172 0.066 0.000 0.616 
electricity sh. 38378 0.026 0.018 0.000 0.286 
other fuels sh. 38378 0.033 0.026 0.000 0.349 
car fuels sh. 38378 0.025 0.023 0.000 0.230 
other goods sh. 38378 0.744 0.076 0.317 0.978 
ln(p_food) 38378 1.285 0.115 0.993 1.681 
ln(p_elect) 38378 1.201 0.000 1.201 1.201 
ln(p_otherfuel) 38378 0.945 0.129 0.384 1.222 
ln(p_carfuel) 38378 0.848 0.000 0.848 0.848 
ln(p_othergood) 38378 1.212 0.087 0.049 1.640 
Adults 38378 2.036 0.831 1.000 8.000 
children 38378 0.595 0.960 0.000 6.000 






Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
disp. inc. 47747 38462.200 20493.800 7454.636 124794.100 
t. expenditures 47747 29171.110 17187.370 3675.714 215394.200 
food exp. 47747 4087.903 2.067.809 4090.335 23813.930 
electricity exp. 47747 570.083 4.102.481 0.000 7415.777 
other fuels exp. 47747 691.718 7.366.757 0.000 16563.810 
car fuels exp. 47747 940.144 7.681.655 0.000 10872.110 
other exp. 47747 22881.260 15783.510 2164.336 207614.400 
food share 47747 0.155 0.069 0.000 0.525 
electricity sh. 47747 0.024 0.017 0.000 0.283 
other fuels sh. 47747 0.030 0.029 0.000 0.383 
car fuels sh. 47747 0.031 0.029 0.000 0.353 
other goods sh. 47747 0.760 0.085 0.347 0.983 
ln(p_food) 47747 1.347 0.004 1.062 1.755 
ln(p_elect) 47747 1.193 0.000 1.193 1.193 
ln(p_otherfuel) 47747 0.951 0.122 0.527 1.304 
ln(p_carfuel) 47747 0.960 0.000 0.960 0.960 
ln(p_othergood) 47747 1.343 0.098 0.153 1.713 
Adults 47747 2.021 0.815 1.000 8.000 
children 47747 0.568 0.912 0.000 6.000 






Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
disp. inc. 41046 41307.400 22416.890 7612.000 131484.000 
t. expenditures 41046 27869.260 16098.570 3206.515 232843.300 
food exp. 41046 3650.286 1909.102 32.000 21440.000 
electricity exp. 41046 662.423 4840.913 0.000 10064.000 
other fuels exp. 41046 930.854 1082.000 0.000 23628.000 
car fuels exp. 41046 1201.276 9895.956 0.000 11424.000 
other exp. 41046 21424.420 14489.550 2470.718 225339.300 
food share 41046 0.144 0.061 0.001 0.571 
electricity sh. 41046 0.028 0.019 0.000 0.350 
other fuels sh. 41046 0.038 0.038 0.000 0.518 
car fuels sh. 41046 0.041 0.037 0.000 0.360 
other goods sh. 41046 0.749 0.083 0.319 0.982 
ln(p_food) 41046 1.386 0.122 1.081 1.756 
ln(p_elect) 41046 1.312 0.000 1.313 1.312 
ln(p_otherfuel) 41046 1.238 0.065 0.931 1.378 
ln(p_carfuel) 41046 1.276 0.000 1.276 1.276 
ln(p_othergood) 41046 1.373 0.074 0.084 1.708 
Adults 41046 1.997 0.824 1.000 8.000 
children 41046 0.440 0.826 0.000 6.000 






Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
disp. inc. 42315 40989.970 22710.660 7504.000 129240.000 
t. expenditures 42315 26306.320 14525.560 3111.000 213739.000 
Food 42315 3847.322 2037.563 28.000 21924.000 
electricity 42315 755.444 5664.706 0.000 11620.000 
other fuels 42315 1203.773 1716.214 255.000 29391.000 
car fuels 42315 1398.887 1223.770 0.000 13376.000 
other goods 42315 19100.890 12446.150 1812.000 201304.000 
food exp. 42315 0.158 0.066 0.001 0.595 
electricity exp. 42315 0.034 0.023 0.000 0.372 
other fuels exp. 42315 0.049 0.052 0.001 0.634 
car fuels exp. 42315 0.049 0.045 0.000 0.531 
other exp. 42315 0.710 0.094 0.100 0.975 
ln(p_food) 42315 1.512 0.172 1.195 1.868 
ln(p_elect) 42315 1.566 0.000 1.566 1.566 
ln(p_otherfuel) 42315 1.662 0.044 1.134 1.907 
ln(p_carfuel) 42315 1.552 0.000 1.553 1.553 
ln(p_othergood) 42315 1.389 0.063 0.181 1.751 
Adults 42315 1.933 0.807 1.000 8.000 
children 42315 0.358 0.749 0.000 6.000 




ln(disp. inc) 0.001* 









Note. Authors’ calculations; Database is IES 1993-2008.  









Quartiles of equivalent income distribution 
Coefficient  0-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-100% 
ߙଵ 0.1469*** 0.1803*** 0.1460*** 0.1279*** 0.1427*** 
ߙଶ 0.0262*** 0.0352*** 0.0299*** 0.0296*** 0.0264*** 
ߙଷ 0.0378*** 0.0448*** 0.0438*** 0.0470*** 0.0401*** 
ߙସ 0.0448*** 0.0344*** 0.0431*** 0.0502*** 0.0547*** 
ߚଵ -0.0680*** 0.0265*** 0.0353*** 0.0311*** -0.0537*** 
ߚଶ -0.0121*** -0.0056*** -0.0033*** -0.0055*** -0.0097*** 
ߚଷ -0.0126*** -0.0121*** -0.0104*** -0.0152*** -0.0094*** 
ߚସ -0.0010*** 0.0211*** 0.0073*** -0.0035*** -0.0223*** 
ߛଵଵ -0.0036*** -0.0400*** -0.0400*** -0.0417*** -0.0105*** 
ߛଵଶ 0.0025*** 0.0017** -0.0019* -0.0023*** 0.0018*** 
ߛଵଷ -0.0066*** 0.0054*** 0.0085*** 0.0112*** -0.0030*** 
ߛଵସ -0.0109*** 0.0039*** -0.0004 -0.0024** -0.0048*** 
ߛଶଶ 0.0052*** 0.0019 0.0043*** 0.0032*** 0.0091*** 
ߛଶଷ 0.0049*** 0.0094*** 0.0075*** 0.0079*** 0.0016*** 
ߛଶସ 0.0015*** 0.0059*** 0.0021*** -0.0006 -0.0007 
ߛଷଷ 0.0141*** 0.0120*** 0.0055*** 0.0049*** 0.0113*** 
ߛଷସ 0.0053*** -0.0033*** 0.0087*** 0.0113*** 0.0094*** 
ߛସସ 0.0324*** 0.0352*** 0.0305*** 0.0289*** 0.0232*** 
ߩଵ 0.9641*** 0.1426*** 0.1424*** 0.1418*** 0.8517*** 
ߩଶ 0.4098*** 0.1414*** 0.1384*** 0.0346* 0.2057*** 
ߠଵଵ -0.0027*** -0.0033*** -0.0044*** -0.0038*** 0.0031*** 
ߠଶଵ 0.0002* 0.0011*** 0.0007*** 0.0011*** -0.0028*** 
ߠଷଵ 0.0019*** 0.0014*** 0.0011*** 0.0020*** -0.0067*** 
ߠସଵ -0.0062*** -0.0029*** -0.0005*** 0.0014*** -0.0035*** 
ߠଶଵ -0.0059*** -0.0023*** -0.0044*** -0.0019*** 0.0066*** 
ߠଶଶ 0.0001 0.0009*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 -0.0009*** 
ߠଷଶ 0.0016*** 0.0010*** 0.0004*** -0.0002 -0.0033*** 
ߠସଶ -0.0041*** -0.0028*** -0.0009*** 0.0000 -0.0012*** 
ߥଵ 0.0095*** -0.0790*** -0.0977*** -0.0923*** -0.0146*** 
ߥଶ -0.0033*** -0.0141*** -0.0132*** -0.0097*** 0.0003 
ߥଷ 0.0018*** -0.0026*** 0.0015*** 0.0088*** 0.0103*** 
ߥସ -0.0047*** -0.0220*** -0.0218*** -0.0166*** 0.0043*** 
Note. Authors’ calculations; Database is IES 1993-2008. *significant at 10%,  








CV (in EUR) 





[1.130; 1.294] [570.424; 576.566] 
Note. Average values of the variables and lower and upper bound 







Note. Database is IES, 2008. Solid line: household type 1- single adults; dashed line: household 
type 2 - single parents; dotted line: household type 3 - two adults no children; dashed and dotted line:  




Note. Average values of CV and lower and upper bound of 95% confidence intervals are provided. 


































































































Note. Average values of the inequality index and total emissions; as well as lower and upper bound of 95% 
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